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Shifting Logics of Legitimation in the Diffusion of Complex Innovations 
 
ABSTRACT 
  
Legitimation and competition are two major forces moulding organizational field and the 
diffusion of innovations. While discursive legitimation provides "rational justifications" for 
innovations, competition may incite organizations to acquire effective innovations pre-
emptively. This paper draws on a case study of the legitimation and diffusion of a 
sophisticated medical technology to suggest that, in highly regulated environments, these two 
forces may interact, and that opposing legitimation strategies may be associated with 
competition. We argue that while convergent discursive legitimation strategies tend to speed 
up the diffusion process, divergent discursive legitimation strategies may have the opposite 
effect. The case suggests that the dominant logics of legitimation may shift, oscillating 
between convergence and divergence as an innovation diffuses. We also show how the 
resulting delays in diffusion may be pre-empted by a phenomenon we call institutional 
delinquency, that is when the moral and cognitive-cultural legitimacies of the technology 
among professionals and managers becomes sufficient to counteract regulatory forces.  
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Legitimation and competition are two major forces shaping organizational fields (Alexander 
& D'Aunno, 2003; Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Scott et al., 2000) and the diffusion of 
innovations (Geroski, 2000). While discursive legitimation provides "rational" justifications 
for innovations (Greenwood et al., 2002; Strang & Meyer, 1993; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996), 
competition may incite organizations to acquire effective innovations pre-emptively. 
Although the interplay between legitimation and competition has been scrutinized by some 
institutional theorists (Alexander & D'Aunno, 2003; Scott et al., 2000), little work has 
examined how these two forces may be related in a highly regulated environment with limited 
resources where the diffusion of innovation may be considered as a cost instead of as a source 
of profit. 
This paper draws on a case study of the legitimation and diffusion of a sophisticated medical 
technology (the Positron Emission Tomography scanner or PET scanner) in the Quebec health 
care context to suggest that, in highly institutionalized environments, these two forces may 
interact, and that opposing discursive legitimation strategies may be associated with 
competition. We argue that while convergent discursive legitimation strategies tend to speed 
up the diffusion process, divergent discursive legitimation strategies may have the opposite 
effect. Thus, our results suggest that contrary to economic wisdom, under certain conditions, 
competition may actually impede the diffusion of innovations. We also show how the 
resulting delays in diffusion may be pre-empted by a phenomenon we call institutional 
delinquency, that is when the moral and cognitive-cultural legitimacies of the technology 
among professionals and managers becomes sufficient to counteract regulatory forces.  
The case suggests that the dominant logics of discursive legitimation may shift, oscillating 
between convergence and divergence as an innovation diffuses. The study also responds to 
calls for greater attention to the collision of different forms of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) 
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and emphasizes the usefulness of documenting the multiple rhetorical strategies involved in 
legitimizing new technology (Greenwood et al., 2002; Munir & Phillips, 2005; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005; van den Hoed & Vergragt, 2004).  
We begin by reviewing the literature on the role of competition and discursive legitimation in 
the diffusion of technology, paying particular attention to the health care sector. We then 
describe the research context and method. The following sections present the case history 
chronologically, tracing the shifting logics of legitimation observed within the organizational 
field studied. We then derive a series of propositions and conclude with implications for 
future research. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Competition and the diffusion of innovation 
Competition is believed to be a powerful force moulding the diffusion of innovations 
(Christensen et al., 2000; Nelson et al., 1967; Rapoport, 1978; Schumpeter, 1944). 
Schumpeter (1944) was the first to propose that competition is the fundamental motor of 
innovation understood as invention, and that it increases with market concentration. This 
hypothesis has been under relentless scrutiny since then, but studies have shown inconclusive 
results (Cohen & Levin, 1989). However, his idea that competition stimulates innovation has 
been taken up by scholars and applied to the health care industry in relation not to invention, 
but to the diffusion of existing innovations. In this respect, most of the studies in this sector 
support the hypothesis that an environment conducive to competition increases the speed of 
diffusion of innovation.  
However, competition takes on a particular form in this sector. Because of third-party payer 
mechanisms and universal coverage, hospitals do not compete on price to attract patients but 
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on quality and status which are defined as having highly specialized equipment and personnel, 
and as offering a wide range of services. Consequently, the better equipped a hospital is, the 
easier it is to retain and attract good quality physicians, and ultimately to admit more patients 
(Lee, 1971). This nonprice competitive mechanism, which tends to increase the diffusion of 
innovation, has been empirically corroborated by various studies for diagnostic devices (Chou 
et al., 2004; Hillman et al., 1987; Rapoport, 1978; Vogt et al., 1995), and for services such as 
24-hour emergency care and cardiac catheterization (Luft et al., 1986). Also, the supply of 
specialized services has been found to be more intensive and duplicative in competitive 
settings to attract physicians and patients (Dranove & Satterthwaite, 2000; Dranove et al., 
1992; Robinson et al., 1987), a phenomenon known as the "medical arms race." In general, 
scholars agree that services increasing patient admissions are more likely to diffuse widely 
(Luft et al., 1986).  
Intraspeciality rivalry as a special form of competition also increases the speed of diffusion.  
For example, the rapid diffusion of laparascopic cholecystectomy has been attributed to 
competition among surgeons (Denis et al., 2002; Escarce et al., 1995; Gelijns & Fendrick, 
1993). Interspeciality rivalry has also been identified as a force increasing the diffusion of 
innovations for the treatment of angina pectoris and gallstones (Gelijns & Rosenberg, 1994).  
While competition increases the speed of diffusion, most studies have not traced the processes 
of diffusion in depth (Renshaw et al., 1990), other than indicating that diffusion flows from 
higher status teaching hospitals to less prestigious ones (Lee, 1971; Rapoport, 1978; Vogt et 
al., 1995).  
Legitimation and the diffusion of innovation 
To gain legitimacy, organizations adopt different behaviours ranging from actions such as 
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complying to rules, norms and culturally shared beliefs, to manipulating their environment by 
the means of discursive strategies (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). By providing general 
abstract models and rationalized causality (Strang & Soule, 1998), "theorization" is a 
discursive strategy that enhances legitimacy as it contributes to the objectificationi and taken-
for-grantedness of an innovation (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). While local theorization involves 
ad hoc peer-to-peer interactions to "make sense of the world" (Strang & Meyer, 1993: 493), 
global theorization is believed to accelerate and widen the diffusion of innovation by 
abstractly homogenizing a potential population of adopters, by specifying the properties and 
outcomes of an innovation, and by identifying theorists behaving according to the theoretical 
model as conduits of diffusion (Strang & Meyer, 1993). The more abstract the theorization, 
the greater its influence on diffusion. Thus, theorization can be conceptualized as a discursive 
strategy providing rationales, meanings and interpretations that legitimate and make sense of 
adopting innovations. 
To be effective, theorization has to perform two tasks that are 1) specifying an organizational 
problem, and 2) justifying a solution (Greenwood et al., 2002; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). 
Failing to provide both of these discursive elements would endanger attempts to 
institutionalize social practices (Greenwood et al., 2002). In addition, the theorization itself 
has to be perceived as natural, morally appropriate or aligned with interests of strategic actors 
for an innovation to become legitimate and ultimately be diffused (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). 
When applied to the diffusion of technology, theorization has been found to be involved in 
defining the position of new actors in the institutional field, as well as creating new objects 
and new concepts (Munir & Phillips, 2005). Yet, while theorization is associated with the 
legitimation of novelty, to be effective, it also needs to be embedded in or artfully connected 
to shared cultural understandings (Munir & Phillips, 2005; Strang & Soule, 1998), prevailing 
 7 
discourses (Vaara et al., 2006), or institutional logics (Scott, 2004). 
Institutional logics condense rules, norms and belief systems into practices and symbolism 
thereby constituting organizing principles guiding behaviours of actors in a given field 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991). Specifically, in his analysis of the transformations of health care 
in the San Francisco Bay, Scott et al. (2004; 2000) identify three competing institutional 
logics in the health care field that are carried by institutional actors. The institutional logic of 
1) quality of care, a professional logic, is incarnated by physicians who promote technological 
change in order to provide best quality services to patients. Professional associations are the 
guardians of this logic. The institutional logic of 2) equity of access appeared with the 
development of universal coverage systems in OECD countries (WHO, 2000). These systems 
were created after the Second World War (WHO, 2000) and sustained by bureaucrats to 
ensure that everyone had access to care. However, universal coverage sparked increasing 
costs that stimulated a need for enhanced control. Taking the private sector has an archetype 
of success, market mechanisms based on the 'managed care' concept were introduced in the 
US, thereby creating a third institutional logic related to 3) efficiency. These three logics offer 
competing forces that sculpt the dynamic of the health care institutional field. While the health 
care industries in different countries have mixed these logics very differently (Tuohy, 1999), 
the competing logics of quality, equity and efficiency are inherent in all of them and very 
much in evidence in the Canadian context (Denis et al., 2003) as we shall see in this study. 
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Of course, theorization alone is not sufficient for an innovation to diffuse. Tangible examples 
of successful adoption must support theorization (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) which renders 
action an indispensable ingredient besides theorization for an innovation to gain legitimacy 
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Suchman, 1995). Somehow, the early stages of diffusion must be 
based on the capacity for an innovation to solve problems or obtain positive returns 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Overall, while studies on the effect of competition on the diffusion of innovation in health 
care have taken place in the market settings such as United States, Japan or Taiwan, few 
studies have looked at the role of competition in a highly regulated environment. In addition, 
institutional accounts have mainly focused on the legitimation of new organizational forms, 
but neglected the legitimation process of technical innovation at the institutional level. This 
study bridges up the concepts of competition and legitimation in the context of the diffusion 
of a complex innovation in a highly regulated field, examining more particularly how various 
institutional logics are mobilized within a competitive process. 
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY 
Research context 
The study described in this paper is part of a larger investigation of the impact of the 
institutional environment on the processes of legitimation and diffusion of technology in the 
health care sector, involving the comparison of two different national health care systems 
(Quebec and Switzerland). Since the research is concerned with the understanding of 
processes evolving over time, a longitudinal case study approach is appropriate (Patton, 2002; 
Yin 2003). In the current paper, we focus more particularly on how and why logics of 
legitimation evolved for an important technological innovation in one of the two jurisdictions.  
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Specifically, the diffusion of Positron Emission Tomography (PET scanner) in the Quebec 
health care system was the focus of this study. The PET scanner is a very complex and 
expensive diagnostic imaging technology that was initially rather controversial. Although 
clinical applications are now fairly universally accepted, the cost-effectiveness of this 
technology is still debated (Adams et al., 2006). Indeed, the high acquisition cost of 
approximately $1.8 millions US for the camera and the impressive operational budget of $1.3 
million US per year are a major counterweight to the benefits at least in some jurisdictions 
(Adams et al., 2006). The complexity of the PET scanner derives in large part from the 
necessity of having a cyclotron nearby to produce the radiopharmaceuticals injected into the 
patient during the diagnostic procedure. Many of these radiopharmaceuticals have very short 
half-lives, and must be produced on site. A cyclotron costs around $3.6 millions US and 
requires highly qualified personnel as well as a major improvement to hospital infrastructure 
to comply with nuclear regulations. 
Mainly used in nuclear medicine to diagnose cancer, the PET scanner has a long history in 
neurology where it provided revolutionary imagery of brain functioning. By the eighties, 
severe cardiac conditions were being diagnosed with this technology. The discovery of the 
most important radiopharmaceutical (Rohren & Coleman, 2004), fluorodesoxyglucose (FDG), 
was a significant breakthrough enabling the PET scanner to diagnose cancer. Since there are 
many applications in cardiology, neurology, and oncology, inter-speciality competition to 
acquire the technology can occur.  
The Quebec health care system provides universal coverage to the whole population for a 
wide range of medical services. The system possesses most of the characteristics of a highly 
structured organizational field according to the dimensions proposed by Scott (2004). The 
system is 1) centrally administered and funded by the Ministry of Health which delegates 
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operations to Regional Health Authorities and health care institutions. Because the 
governance structure is centrally imposed, 2) unity of governance is fairly high. Moreover, the 
principal mode of governance is 3) mainly public (one mode of governance dominates), there 
are a 4) limited number of structural models for hospitals (structural isomorphism), and 5) 
formal organizational linkages are numerous. These five dimensions tend to produce a high 
degree of structural isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2004).  
Because the State administers the health care system and is the single authorized insurer for 
basic health care coverage, the adoption of new technology is not accounted for as a source of 
profit by the regulator, but as a cost. This leads authorities to be reluctant to invest or to allow 
reimbursement of costly procedures among organizations in the field. To ensure that an 
innovation is worthy to be reimbursed and diffused, the government may rely on the 
recommendations of the Health Technology Assessment Agency (HTAA). 
While the health care system is centrally managed and publicly funded, different forms of 
nonprice based competition are embedded within it. Most critically, physicians are generally 
paid on a fee-for-service basis and therefore may compete with each other in a market for 
patients. Moreover, hospitals' survival depends on attracting qualified medical specialists and 
these specialists thus have an important influence on organizational strategy. Competition for 
prestige, resources, and investment among institutions can therefore be intense. Since 
resources are largely controlled by government, this competition often plays itself out in the 
public sphere. Legitimation and competition thus become inextricably intertwined. This case 
seems a suitable site for examining the interaction of these processes.  
Data collection and analysis 
In total, 46 in-depth interviews from 60 to 90 minutes each were carried out with key people 
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involved in the diffusion of the PET scanner at the local, regional, national, and international 
levels. Internal and public documents were used for triangulation purposes (Patton, 2002). The 
interview guide covered respondents' perceptions of the institutional environment, of the 
innovation itself, and of the role of different participants in adoption both within their own 
local context as well as more broadly. Particular attention was paid to arguments for and 
against the technology and legitimation strategies. The research protocol followed closely that 
used by Denis et al. (2002). Data collection was conducted in two waves. In the first wave, 22 
interviews were conducted, coded and analysed. The interview guide (Eisenhardt 1989; Miles 
and Huberman 1994) was modified according to the partial results and 24 more interviews 
were performed to saturate the data set (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
Descriptive case studies were written to break down the complexity of the data into 
manageable chunks (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999). An extensive case narrative was 
written covering the three regions that initially adopted the first six PET scanners in the 
Quebec health care system. Data were organized using a visual mapping strategy (Langley, 
1999) to draw out the key patterns. The data were then coded with the N'Vivo program 
resulting in a grounded set of legitimation categories. Visual mapping and matrix displays 
were used to explore, analyse, and display results (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The following 
section presents the case history divided into four eras, each reflecting a shift in the logics of 
legitimation. For the two competitive eras, we will present the theorizations of the technology 
generated by competing groups under three headings: the definition of the innovation itself, 
why it should be adopted, and (critical for this study) who should adopt. 
CASE HISTORY 
Each of the four phases constituting this case begins with a particular event that marks the 
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legitimation process for the diffusion of the PET scanner in this organizational field. The 
"research era" portrays the development of the PET scanner as a research tool in neurology, 
cardiology, and oncology. The "clinical era" is characterized by the first clinical use of this 
technology in this jurisdiction, and by the publication of the Health Technology Assessment 
Agency (HTAA) report that provides evidence-based legitimacy to the PET scanner. The 
"confrontational era" features the dispute over the implementation of the recommendations of 
the HTAA report. Finally, the public announcement of a dissemination plan of the PET 
scanner in the organizational field is the central event of the "regulation era." Three natural 
geographic regions that are fairly physically remote from one another are designated by the 
letters A, B and C, where A is the most populated region, C the second most demographically 
important, and B a relatively less populated area that nevertheless included a university with a 
faculty of medicine. 
1. The Research era (1974 - 1997) 
The first PET scanner was acquired by a major university in region A in 1974 for research 
applications in neurology. In 1995, the second PET scanner was bought in the relatively less 
populated region B. While the acquisition of the first PET scanner in neurology was clearly 
the result of independent research funds, the acquisition of the second PET scanner happened 
as the result of the entrepreneurship of a nuclear doctor who relentlessly fought to convince 
various governmental departments to invest in the project of creating a research center which 
would include a PET scanner and a cyclotron for research applications in oncology. For 
twenty years, this entrepreneur built up organizational assets such as developing an 
internationally known group of researchers in radiation technology, offering a unique PhD in 
radiation in Canada, and patenting a PET scanner prototype, all of which contributed to 
consecrate B1 as a major centre in nuclear medicine. These assets provided the teaching 
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hospital B1 with an organizational legitimacy based on its competence that was a major 
ingredient in convincing authorities to finance its project.  
While the acquisition of the PET scanner by B1 encountered no competition either locally or 
provincially, the competition in region C between C2, a specialized hospital in cardiology and 
in lung cancer, and C1, the most important teaching hospital in the area, seriously impeded 
any attempt at adoption. As early as 1988, both hospitals were striving to convince the 
Provincial Ministry of Health to acquire a PET scanner for clinical as well as for research 
purposes, but in vain. Later on, with the emergence of evidence for the potential of the 
technology for lung cancer, both hospitals submitted a report to the Regional Health Board. 
These reports draw on competing theorizations that are summarized in Table 1.   
Specifically, because of its dual mission in cardiology and in lung cancer, C2 declared itself to 
be the best centre to receive a PET scanner. C2 contended that its supra-regional mission 
combined with being the hospital performing the highest number of cardiac surgical 
operations justified obtaining a PET scanner. Since the evidence on the potential in the case of 
lung cancer was indisputable, C2 also highlighted the fact they were performing the highest 
number of surgeries in pulmonary cancer. On the other hand, C1 was arguing that oncology 
was the main application of PET scanner. Given that more than half of the clinical activities in 
oncology in the region C were performed at C1, it argued that it should be the first centre to 
adopt a PET scanner. Also since the cyclotron was an essential ingredient to produce 
radiopharmaceuticals, its location also became an issue. Because the half-life of the 
radiopharmaceutical used in cardiology is approximately 2 minutes, C2 was arguing that the 
cyclotron should be close to their building. Emphasizing its mission in research and in 
evaluating new technology, C1 argued that the cyclotron should be in their organization. 
These self-interested arguments and destructive battles oriented around pragmatic legitimation 
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(Suchman, 1995) did not contribute to helping accelerate the diffusion of the technology.  
Table 1: Competing Quality-Based Theorizations during the Research Era 
THEORIZATION 
COMPONENTS 
Hospital C1: PET for oncology Hospital C2: PET for cardiology 
What to adopt? Definition 
of the innovation 
 
Oncology vs. Cardiology 
• PET as a research tool 
• PET as a clinical tool for oncology 
 
Argument supported by one article 
containing a systematic review of evidence 
supporting PET for oncology. 
 
"Clinical indications for the PET technology 
are by order of importance, oncology (over 
18 pathologies for which indications are 
recognized), neurology (2 indications), and 
cardiology (1 indication)."  
 
• PET as a clinical tool for cardiology 
and pulmonary oncology 
 
Argument supported by reference to 51 
studies, 42 of which provide evidence for 
cardiac applications. 
 
"The two areas where clinical use and 
potential are best developed and recognized 
are precisely for heart disease and lung 
cancer." 
Why adopt? 
 
Moral legitimation founded 
on common quality-based 
logic but a different 
definition of the innovation 
• PET has several clinical advantages 
 
Early diagnosis of cancer 
Early evaluation of the effectiveness of 
anticancer therapeutic interventions 
etc. 
• PET scanner is effective 
 
"Several studies confirmed the high 
diagnostic performance of the PET scanner 
for the detection of heart disease." 
"The PET scanner has emerged as an 
important diagnostic tool in the treatment of 
lung cancer." 
Who should adopt and 
how? 
 
Common quality-based 
arguments based on 
different definitions of the 
innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asymmetric quality-based 
arguments based on 
competence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asymmetric efficiency-
based arguments 
• Those whose missions and activities 
are aligned with the technology 
 
Hospital Mission: Large volume of patients 
in oncology; particular research vocation. 
"The strong points of the hospital were that 
it was a large hospital treating more than 
half of the clinical activity in oncology in the 
region." 
"C1 wanted the machine because they are a 
centre for excellence and technology 
evaluation. They wanted to do research with 
that." 
 
• Those with appropriate competence 
"At C1, there was already a physician team. 
We had hired two nuclear doctors who were 
trained or in training with fellowships of a 
least a year."  
"We already had a solid physician team to 
make the cyclotron work, and to take care of 
it." 
 
• Those whose missions and activities 
are aligned with the technology 
 
Hospital Mission: Large volume of patients 
in cardiology and lung cancer. 
"C2 is a designated university institute in 
cardiology and pneumology where the 
highest number of heart surgeries are 
undertaken each year. It is also the centre 
with the highest number of lung cancer 
surgeries" 
"We have the largest group of pneumology 
specialists in Canada." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Those who need the cyclotron close to 
their installation 
"Our argument at C2 was that we needed the 
cyclotron in cardiology given the short half-
lives of radiopharmaceuticals in this 
speciality" 
"By having it on our site, it could still be 
used by Hospital C1 who work more in 
oncology" 
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Analysis. Competition pushed the hospitals to develop different theorizations aimed at shaping 
the perception of authorities regarding what was the purpose of the technology, as well as why 
and how it should be diffused. They mainly drew on clinical scientific evidence to support 
their arguments. Accordingly, each hospital deployed a quality-based theorization to 
convince the authorities. Our analysis illuminates three dimensions of theorization: 1) the 
definition of the technology (what), 2) benefits of the technology (why), and 3) justifying a 
solution (who and how). First, given the uncertainty surrounding what the technology could 
actually achieve, both camps were using different scientific evidence to define the technology 
in a way that supported their positions. For example, whereas C1 argued that there were 
potentially many more applications in oncology using one paper developing a systematic 
literature review; C2 displayed a large array of studies in cardiology involving the PET 
scanner to prove its significance in this domain while also emphasizing its maturity for lung 
cancer applications. The second dimension concerns why this technology should be diffused. 
Interestingly, both actors emphasized similar arguments but aligned with different definitions 
of the technology. The third element is related to the how to diffuse or how to implement the 
technology locally. Again, the actors proposed to align diffusion of the technology with their 
interpretation of the evidence and its fit with hospital's mission. Indeed, each hospital asserted 
that their specialty was precisely related to the state of the evidence to provide legitimacy to 
their institutional position in the field as being a potential receiver.  
In addition, C1 used competence-based arguments to further enhance its organizational 
legitimacy, while C2 invoked pragmatic issues of efficiency related to the location of the 
cyclotron. Nevertheless as shown in Table 1, the dominant institutional logic invoked in this 
debate was clearly based on quality of care (Scott, 2004). The arguments about the evidence, 
and the clear perception that the two hospitals saw that evidence differently and were at the 
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same time undermining the theoretical claims of their adversaries did not contribute to 
accelerating diffusion at this point. 
2. The clinical era (1998-2000) 
Due to the underutilisation of the PET scanner in research, hospital B1 began to use the 
machine for clinical applications. After having hardly fought to obtain an operational budget 
from the Ministry of Health, B1 used the PET scanner in the clinical setting by 1998. This 
aroused consternation among nuclear doctors around the province, and especially from those 
practising in teaching hospitals who felt that it was irrational that the only clinically 
operational scanner should be in a remote region. This prompted those hospitals to pressure 
for a PET scanner for themselves. In addition, the decision of the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) to authorize the reimbursement of the PET scanner for lung cancer 
as well as the wide and fast diffusion of this technology in USA contributed to build up 
pressure on the Ministry of Health to more widely diffuse the technology.  
"The FDA [Federal Drug Administration] had an impact on demand because, once 
the FDA had recognized the technology, and especially the CMS… which is the 
payer, when they began to pay in the States, then of course there were huge 
pressures here because we always compare ourselves with the United States in a 
North-American environment."  
Meanwhile, the competition between the pulmonary-cardiac hospital C2 and the teaching 
hospital C1 continued, and was even exacerbated with the surfacing of a rumour suggesting 
that only one PET scanner camera would be installed in region C. The competition was even 
more acute with the entry of a new hospital into this technological arms race. Tension 
increased to the point that in 2000, the Regional Health Board in Region C decided to create a 
committee to sort out the tense situation. Using the same arguments as the previous report of 
1997, each hospital developed a second report which was submitted to the Health Regional 
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Board in July 2001. In parallel with these formal discussions hospitals were actively lobbying 
regional and provincial authorities.  
All together, these quarrels, the first clinical use of the technology in Quebec, the 
authorization to reimburse the PET scanner procedure by the CMS, and the emerging 
evidence in the scientific literature praising the clinical benefits of the PET scanner stimulated 
the president of a Medical Association (MA) and another patient’s association to ask the 
Health Technology Assessment Agency (HTAA) to produce a report on the cost-effectiveness 
of this technology. The request was addressed to the HTAA in September 2000.  
If the legitimation of the PET scanner as a clinical tool in this organizational field was 
strongly enhanced with the first clinical use and with the authorization for reimbursement by 
the CMS, the publication of the report of the HTAA in October 2001 confirmed the evidence-
based legitimacy of the PET scanner in this organizational field as an indispensable diagnostic 
tool for specific conditions. The HTAA report concludes: 
"In its capacity to inform on both the anatomic location of tissues and on their 
dynamic functions, the PET scanner makes an important contribution to medical 
imaging."  
The clinical conclusions of this report were unequivocal. The need for more PET scanners 
was undeniable, and at least 15,000 exams were said to be required annually. Although the 
report is very prudent regarding the main application of the technology, all the experts agreed 
with this report that the PET scanner was to be used essentially in oncology. The following 
quotations from interviews support our contention that from then on the technology was 
perceived as legitimate from a clinical point of view. Indeed, all the citations point to an 
evidence-based legitimacy that would eventually lead to the technology being taken for 
granted as an essential medical tool based on a quality of care institutional logic. 
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"It's like asking whether you need an operating room in a hospital. (…) It's an 
indispensable and necessary tool." 
- Nuclear doctor 
"It's inevitable, it's a question of the quality of medicine. Some will even say that it 
is bad medical practice not to use it in diagnosis." 
- President of the Medical Association 
"After the HTAA report, the first and most visible impact is that we rapidly 
received many demands from the hospitals that were all referring to this report."  
-Biomedical engineer 
Later on, the Committee of the Regional Health Board of region C agreed that three machines 
were required in the area. This recommendation to the Provincial Ministry of Health initially 
relieved C1 and C2 from their fierce competition, at least regarding this issue. These 
recommendations came jointly with the presentation of the HTAA report in 2001 which 
precipitated an intensive debate over the way the PET scanner should be disseminated at the 
provincial institutional field level.  
Analysis. During this era, the definition of the PET scanner mutated from a research tool to an 
evidence-based legitimated clinical diagnostic device. The first clinical use and the 
reimbursement of the procedure by the CMS contributed, at least partially, to the legitimacy 
of the procedure in this organizational field. Indeed, while the former launched a signal the 
technology was mature enough to be used in a clinical setting in Quebec, the latter 
demonstrated that the technique was recognized as effective in another organizational field. 
Maybe even more important is the conclusion of the HTAA report which recognizes without 
any doubt the clinical usefulness of the procedure thereby legitimating the PET scanner. As 
compared with previous attempts and diverging theorizations, this report more clearly 
specifies a reason to diffuse the technology related to the needs of the population in terms of 
15,000 exams per year. Considering the consensual acknowledgement that the PET scanner is 
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an essential clinical tool, we argue that the clinical era is characterised by convergent 
quality-based legitimation where all actors agree on the value of the technology for clinical 
applications. The next era describes the confrontation regarding the implementation of the 
PET scanner and the institutional delinquency that resulted from government inaction. 
3. The Confrontational Era (October 2001-2004) 
Although the clinical conclusions of the HTAA report provided evidence-based legitimacy to 
the PET scanner based on the logic of quality of care, the recommendation suggesting that the 
PET scanner technology should be consolidated into existing centers raised several concerns 
among nuclear doctors. This recommendation was perceived by the Medical Association 
(MA) as a signal that the PET scanner technology was going to be diffused to only two 
teaching hospitals. This was perceived by the MA as a way of favouring research at the 
expense of clinical applications. To counter these recommendations, the MA created a special 
committee rallying nuclear doctors in remote hospitals, and began to directly negotiate with 
the Government in power. 
By primarily defining the PET scanner as a clinical device and not a research tool, the aim of 
this special committee was to counteract the recommendations favouring teaching hospitals, 
and to democratize access to this high-end medical technology by proposing that 12 major 
centres in oncology should obtain a PET scanner. By February 2003, after the teaching 
hospital A2 adopted a PET scanner without the consent of authorities, but also after intense 
negotiations, the Ministry of Health agreed to invest $23 millions US to buy 12 PET scanners 
and to diffuse them all over the province. However, this informal agreement between the 
government and the special committee aborted with the change of the government following 
the election of April 2003. This marks a radical shift in the dissemination plan for the 
technology. With the priority of the newly elected government on creating Integrated Health 
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University Networks, the new Minister of Health planned to diffuse the relatively new and 
more effective architectureii (Henderson & Clark, 1990) of the technology: the PET-CT. 
In fact, by 2001, the architecture of the PET scanner technology had evolved to include a CT 
scanner, thereby creating a PET-CT. Because the CT scanner provides quasi instantaneous 
anatomical images, the combination of both technologies increased the precision of the 
diagnosis considering that the PET scanner provides unrivalled functional images. With the 
emergence of this alternative, two types of architecture were available on the market: PET-CT 
and PET only. 
Experts estimated that the clinical added-value of PET-CT over PET only existed for 
approximately 15% of cases, mainly in the otorhinolaryngology speciality. In addition, the 
PET-CT allowed a hospital to perform 12 cases per day instead of 8 with a PET scanner only. 
This is due to the fact that the addition of the CT scanner reduced the timeiii required to scan a 
patient. Besides allowing more patients to be diagnosed per day per machine, acquiring a 
PET-CT would allow teaching hospitals to participate in international research protocols. 
Indeed, the PET-CT was becoming a standard in research for OECD countries.  
The parallel development of this new architecture with the publication of the HTAA report 
turned the institutional dynamic into a confrontation between two clans: the Pro-PET-only 
against the Pro-PET-CT coalitions. Because the cost of a PET-CT was twice the price of PET 
only ($3.7 millions US), promoting the diffusion of the former was equivalent to encouraging 
narrower diffusion considering that a limited amount of the $23 millions US was still 
available, and that to perform research at least two more $4 millions cyclotron were required. 
Hence, the advent of the PET-CT was not good news for the pro-PET-only coalition. 
Although the new government had the intention to go with the PET-CT and to diffuse it to 
 21 
only few centres that is to teaching hospitals, moving without the support of the medical 
association would have been politically risky. A new round of negotiations had to be opened. 
Disagreeing with the policy of the new government, the MA invested in different lobbying 
actions to convince the government of the necessity of diffusing the PET scanner to as many 
places as possible for people to have access to this technology. As one interviewee reports: 
"We made our presentation by sending a letter. We try to contact people in the 
Ministry. We sent a letter signed by three department heads and the president of 
the medical council. We showed them the facts, we gave the arguments that I 
listed just now to sensitize people. The Association also sent a letter to say that we 
did not agree that it would only be in the teaching hospitals. As an association, we 
wanted a wider deployment of the PET scanner to 12 centres. " 
With the arrival of PET-CT, private manufacturers had an incentive to influence the diffusion 
given that the profit margin on this technology was higher than for the PET only. Of course, 
part of the margin came from the higher selling price, but also from the yearly recurring 
maintenance costs which correspond to 10% of the selling price - twice as high as for a PET 
only. This prompted private manufacturers to ally with teaching hospitals to promote the 
diffusion of the PET-CT to a smaller number of sites. 
Transformed into a legitimation battlefield with two confronting factions, this institutional 
field witnessed several theorization strategies deployed by the two camps. The Pro-PET-only 
coalition used an access-based theorization strategy, composed of moral and pragmatic 
arguments, to deplore the insufficient number of PET scanners in the Quebec health care 
system (problem), and to justify a wider diffusion of the technology to the previously-
designated regional centres in oncology (solution). The rationale was to give the population 
access to the technology independently of their location, a real challenge in a huge territory 
like Quebec. To support this view, it was argued that it did was unethical for children to go 
through useless chemotherapy as well as asking them to travel long distances to get a PET 
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scan. Other arguments involved reference to the common good and solidarity given that 
adopting 12 machines would economize on useless surgeries thereby allowing better resource 
allocation.  
Table 2: Competing Theorizations during the Confrontational Era 
THEORIZATION 
COMPONENTS 
PET Only 
Access-based logic 
PET-CT 
Quality-based logic 
What to adopt? Definition 
of the innovation 
 
• PET as a proven clinical tool needed 
by all regardless of location 
• PET-CT as a high-performing proven 
clinical and research tool 
Why adopt? 
 
Moral legitimation 
essentially grounded in 
equity of access-based 
arguments vs. quality-
based arguments 
 
 
 
Competing interpretations 
of efficiency-based logic 
tied to access-based and 
quality-based arguments 
respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asymmetric naturalization 
arguments 
• PET scan for all 
"Chemotherapy is hard as a treatment. 
That's why with the PET scanner, we can 
evaluate whether local radiotherapy or 
chemotherapy would be better and protect 
the child from suffering. [...] Just think if you 
have a 12 year-old child who needs 
radiotherapy and you have to send them to 
the big city. It's torture." 
 
• Low purchase costs and lower travel 
costs with greater equity and access 
"Oncology is permanent. You have your 
cancer, you come back, you are re-
evaluated. There's a lot of travelling. So the 
PET will allow the regionalization of care, 
keeping resources, people, and avoiding 
excessive travel costs."  
"The Association favours the dedicated PET 
cameras that are twice as cheap [than PET-
CT], but everyone would get one."  
"[With PET] we can save $15,000-$20,000 
for people we operate on unnecessarily." 
• Better quality diagnoses 
"A PET scanner will locate the tumor… in 
the body but not in a specific way. It will 
say: it is there. But with the CT, we can take 
a tomographic image which will locate the 
tumor in the tissue so we can see exactly 
where it is." 
 
 
 
• Lower cost per examination with 
higher quality 
"So, typically, if you look today at a typical 
hospital they take may be 15-20 minutes to 
do the attenuation correction a piece [with a 
PET scanner only] versus 30 seconds [with 
a PET-CT]. […] [Moreover], The FDG cost 
per patient is significantly less."  
"An ordinary PET scanner can do about six 
or seven patients per day. With the PET-CT, 
we can go up to 12 so we can double the 
volume. " 
 
 
• Inevitability of PET-CT 
"[In the conference] basically nobody was 
speaking of PET only. Nobody. [...] I can’t 
think of a single institution that has actively 
gone to tender for PET only." 
 
Who should adopt and 
how? 
 
Distribution based on equity 
(access-based logic) vs. 
competence (quality-based 
logic). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• PET for all, coherence with prior 
distribution of oncology centres 
"Better give everyone a good Chrysler than 
giving a Ferrari to 3 or 4 people, that's what 
we wanted at the Association."  
"With the government, we proposed that the 
15,000 exams that were necessary per year 
in oncology, that the 12 first pieces of 
equipment be installed in the regional 
centres for oncology as the government had 
already done. it." 
 
• Competence has to be developed first 
before allowing adoption 
"There's the whole human aspect around it. 
That means doctors who are able to read,   
physicists who know how to operate it, 
technical personnel to make it work. That 
can't be created with the snap of the fingers. 
[...] Except that we need to do that step by 
step. We'll begin by equipping the major 
teaching centres adequately with good teams 
who'll be able to train other teams 
afterwards, and so on. The magic thinking to 
say we will open 10 scanners tomorrow 
morning and everything will work, that will 
kill the technique. It  has to be progressive".  
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In constrast, the Pro-PET-CT coalition invoked moral arguments related to the technical 
superiority of the PET-CT – a quality-based logic. Whereas the access-based theorization 
stressed the importance of widely diffusing the technology, the quality-based theorization 
defined efficiency in techno-economic terms related to a single machine and not to the impact 
of the diffusion of many machines across the organizational field. Arguments related to the 
inevitability of the PET-CT were also put forward. In consonance with its quality orientation, 
the Pro-PET-CT coalition proposed that the technology had to be diffused along competence-
lines. This group argued that nuclear doctors must be well trained to perform good quality 
diagnoses, and that this technology had to be further developed thereby deeming the PET 
scanner technology as a research as well as a clinical tool.  
Hence, this coalition defended the idea that the best technical machine had to be purchased to 
ensure quality. Overall, while the epidemiological perspective promoting a wide diffusion is 
at the heart of the legitimation strategy of the Pro-PET-only coalition, the Pro-PET-CT clan is 
clearly in favour of narrower diffusion of more highly-performing machines as shown in 
Table 2.  
These two divergent legitimation strategies are the expression of a competition between two 
factions having divergent interests in the diffusion of the PET scanner. For the MA, wider 
diffusion would satisfy more members and would reinforce the profession of nuclear doctors, 
while rendering the services accessible to a larger portion of the population. For doctors in 
teaching hospitals, adopting a PET-CT would allow them to participate in international 
protocols as well as to have more effective and efficient machines, and in the end increase 
their prestige through the acquisition of the latest technology.  
Because the two factions within the profession of nuclear doctors could not agree on which 
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architecture of the innovation should be diffused and to what extent, the government decided 
to withhold any decision. While attempts at negotiation failed, the same hospital B1, which 
had been the first to use the PET scanner in a clinical setting, acquired a second PET scanner, 
but, officially, for research purpose. This adoption was the consequence of a private-public 
partnership, and was attributed to the highly positive reputation B1 developed regarding this 
technology. This second adoption brought consternation all over the province. By this time, 
private companies had begun distributing FDG, and possessing a cyclotron was no longer an 
issue to be able to deliver PET scanner diagnosis. 
Analysis. This period shows how competing institutional logics may be mobilized to defend 
different modes of diffusion of a technology even when its basic utility has been fully 
legitimized as it was in the HTAA report. Each theorization relies on different moral 
imperatives presenting plausible but incompatible arguments. While the access-based 
theorization strategy focuses on the idea that failing to widely diffuse the technology is 
unethical because suffering and useless operations can be avoided, the quality-based 
theorization underlines the superiority of the more recent technology, its technico-economic 
advantages and the need for the technology to be calibrated and operated by highly skilled and 
competent professionals who master its complexities. Efficiency-based arguments are also 
mobilized by both camps, but they tend to be subordinated to the dominant access and quality-
based logics. 
The acceptance of one or other theorization could have a huge impact. As compared with the 
access-based theorization which contended that this technology should be available in 12 
centres in oncology all over the province, the quality-based theorization was more oriented 
towards the performance of the machine itself. As a consequence, while the pro-PET-only 
clan was arguing that with 12 machines, 96 patients per day (12 patients times 8 patients/day) 
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could have a PET scan in the province, the PET-CT clan was arguing that it was better to have 
4 machines serving 48 patients per day (4 centres times 12 patients /day) in the province, but 
with good quality diagnosis performed by competent staff. The significant underlying 
consequences of adopting one or the other strategies clearly illustrate that effectiveness is 
socially defined (Suchman, 1995) and inevitably implies ethical choices. 
3a. Institutional Delinquency in region A (2003-2004) 
The competition between these two factions in this institutional field placed the government in 
an uncomfortable position since opting for one or other solution was politically very difficult. 
This tended to reaffirm the status quo despite repeated applications from hospitals to obtain a 
PET scanner, and disillusionment and cynicism from many nuclear doctors: 
"The deployment of PET scanners, I've been hearing about that for four years, and 
another announcement arrives every 15th of the month. It's the classic running gag. I've 
stopped believing in that." 
Eventually, unanswered applications to the government for a PET scanner prompted teaching 
hospital A2 to acquire a machine without the required consent of the Ministry of Healthiv. To 
bypass the regulations, A2 convinced its private foundation to buy and rent the PET scanner 
to the hospital for a symbolic sum. By January 2003, the PET scanner was functional. To 
justify this manoeuvre, A2 suggested to the authorities to consider the machine as a research 
tool although everyone knew that it was more than this. Because A2 was in a position to 
publicly justify the need for a PET scanner in oncology to the population, it seemed unlikely 
that the government would denounce it. Given that access to health care services is a public 
service in Quebec, people cannot normally pay privately for health care services that are 
insured by universal coverage. Despite this rule, A2 had to find a way to finance the running 
costs of its PET scanner. The solution was to offer the PET scanner at nights and on week-
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ends on a private basis to companies. This provoked a swift reaction from the Minister of 
Health who asked A2 to stop selling public services to the private sector. In exchange, the 
government would provide them with an operational budget. Hospital A2 immediately 
complied. In February 2003, a few days after this institutionally delinquent adoption, the 
Ministry of Health asked Regional Board of Region A to create a committee to evaluate the 
needs in terms of PET scanners in that region. 
This delinquent behaviour was taken up by other institutions who launched the process for 
adopting a PET-CT even though they had not yet received the formal consent from the 
government. The committee formed by the Regional Health Board produced a document 
which was submitted to the Ministry of Health in April 2004, and concluded that seven 
cameras were necessary to cover the needs of the population in oncology for region A. 
Analysis. The evidence-based legitimacy of the PET scanner acquired through the HTAA 
report was one main factor behind the behaviour of institutional delinquency documented 
above. It was because the technology had become so widely accepted as being an integral part 
of medical practice that hospitals could, in the first place, adopt the technology without the 
consent of the government. Also, the legitimacy of the technology as an essential clinical tool 
minimized the risk incurred by institutional delinquents in acting this way since the 
government had its hands tied in responding to their actions. Any government attempt at 
retaliation against the hospital could easily be denounced in the media as preventing access to 
treatment for cancer patients – not a wise move.  
Moreover, the inertia of the government regarding the conflicting demands from nuclear 
doctors to obtain PET scanners stimulated the institutional delinquent behaviours. In effect, 
the PET-CT clan essentially won out here through their greater access to the resources needed 
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to undertake delinquent strategies. A2’s institutional entrepreneurship had an important 
impact on subsequent dynamics. Indeed, A2 brought another teaching hospital in its wake and 
forced the Ministry of Health to create a regional committee to address this issue. Since the 
Ministry of Health did not announce a dissemination plan for the technology, and because no 
sanctions were applied to the first delinquents, other hospitals adopted the same strategy. 
Indeed, it now became necessary to acquire the technology as quickly as possible if one did 
not want to miss the boat. Institutional delinquency is a deviant behaviour according to the 
law but one which can be perceived as legitimate by professionals and the population in a 
given setting. Thus, institutional delinquency can be seen as a special type of institutional 
entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988) that is rendered possible when normative and cognitive-
cultural forces are stronger than regulative ones.  
4. THE REGULATION ERA (2005-2006) 
When hospitals began buying PET scanners without the specific authorization from the 
Ministry of Health, the government was in an untenable position since it could lose its 
credibility. Chaotic diffusion was probably the main risk the government was facing at this 
point and with this, the potential waste of important resources.  
"The danger was that we would have rather anarchical development. It would be 
those who had the money or those who screamed the most or those who made the 
most pressure that would get the machine."  
Considering the tendency for other OECD countries to buy PET-CT rather than PET alone, 
and since the government was reorganizing health care services on teaching network lines, 
there were several pressures to go for PET-CT. However, the Ministry of Health needed to get 
the support of the pro-PET-only coalition which was still promoting wider diffusion. The pro-
PET-only clan was now ready to accept narrower diffusion as long as the Government would 
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provide guarantee the diffusion of the technology into more peripheral centres. 
Finally, a dissemination plan was developed in which remote hospitals would get a PET 
scanner within a certain timeframe. By the end of 2004, the government made a first 
announcement of the purchase or enhancement of existing equipment from PET scanner only 
to PET-CT for four teaching hospitals. Moreover, the government would provide each of 
these teaching hospitals with an operating budget that was an essential component to make 
this equipment functional. By June 2005, the government announced the dissemination of the 
PET scanner technology in three phases. Phase 1 was already in progress with the equipment 
in these four teaching hospitals. Phase 2 would provide PET scanners to major centres in 
oncology, and Phase 3 would allow smaller hospitals to have a PET scanner only. However, 
in the end, private companies discontinued supplying the less sophisticated technology, 
forcing the choice for PET-CT. 
Analysis. The absence of a credible technology dissemination plan from the government led to 
uncertainty in the institutional field which made many hospitals believe that if they quickly 
acquired a machine then the government would be forced to provide them with an operating 
budget. Aware of this delicate situation, the government publicly announced the plan to put a 
stop to a potentially chaotic dissemination process that could have escalated further out of 
control. This, combined with the fact that the suppliers had themselves converged on a 
dominant design (Abernathy & Utterback, 1988; Anderson & Tushman, 1990) produced 
convergence and eliminated the hostility between factions, at least for the time being. 
DISCUSSION 
Our results suggest that competition feeds legitimation processes, and that both are involved 
in the dynamics of diffusion of a complex technology in a highly regulated environment. 
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Competition between hospitals to acquire this expensive technology is characterized by 
institutional battles where discursive legitimation strategies draw on divergent institutional 
logics and constitute the weaponry of opponents. This war-like diffusion process tends to 
show oscillation between divergence and convergence, corresponding to alternating periods of 
peace and conflict. While divergent competition-based legitimation strategies tend to slow 
down the diffusion process, convergent evidence-based legitimation strategies may have the 
opposite effect. As such, this study documents the colliding of different legitimation processes 
(Suchman, 1995). 
The research era is characterized by divergent theorizations based on different conceptions of 
the nature of the technology, but drawing on a common quality-based institutional logic. 
Fighting using scientifically grounded arguments, evidence from cardiology was employed by 
one camp while the other mobilized evidence in the area of oncology. Each side of this 
institutional battle drew on science to provide moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). These 
theorizations were supported on one side by arguments about competence and on the other by 
effiency-based arguments. The confrontational era also exhibits the colliding of theorizations, 
this time based on different institutional logics (Scott, 2004) of quality and access. While the 
pro-PET-CT group contended that diffusion should follow the flow of competence from 
teaching hospitals to smaller hospitals, defenders of the pro-PET-only faction argued along 
equity of access lines stating that everyone should have access to the technology in order to 
offer a better quality of treatment to all.  
Given these observations, the received wisdom in health economics (Chou et al., 2004; 
Dranove & Satterthwaite, 2000; Dranove et al., 1992; Lee, 1971; Luft et al., 1986; Rapoport, 
1978; Vogt et al., 1995) asserting that nonprice competition (which is often equated to 
competition on quality) has the effect of increasing the diffusion of innovation might be 
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overstated and does not sufficiently consider the context in which this occurs. In a regulated 
environment where innovation is considered to be a cost and not a source of profit, 
competition may prompt institutional battles which slow the diffusion of technology, at least 
in the short run. Revealing divergent legitimation processes, the research and the 
confrontational eras are associated with the postponement of the adoption or the diffusion of 
the PET scanner because in both cases the regulator was stuck between two irreconcilable 
avenues, and because choosing one or the other option would have been politically difficult. 
On the other hand, divergent logics of legitimation create pressure that prompts actors to do 
something about the quarrel - whether asking for a report, lobbying, or acting delinquently by 
adopting the technology without the consent of the authorities. But as long as the conflict 
persists, diffusion is unlikely. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Divergent logics of legitimation tend to slow the diffusion of 
technology in highly regulated environment with limited resources. 
The concept of competition has long been debated in the literature (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). 
Organizational ecologists have defined competition as the struggle for limited resources 
without defining these limits or specifying how actors strive for these resources. In this case 
study, a fixed amount of $23 millions US was dedicated to the deployment of the PET 
scanner. This explicit limit stimulated passionate debates over the strategy for implementing 
this technology.  Consequently, actors were fiercely involved in advocating the legitimacy of 
their organization to be recipients of the PET scanner technology by defining the purpose of 
the diagnostic tool (i.e. cardiology vs. oncology), by trying to influence the type of 
architecture, or by negotiating the scope of the diffusion (i.e. PET only vs. PET-CT). 
Competition for scarce resource in this environment is a strong incentive to elicit discursive 
legitimation strategies, suggesting the following proposition: 
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Proposition 2: Competition between organizations tends to increase legitimation 
activity in highly regulated environment with limited resources. 
While the research and confrontational eras are characterized by divergence in theorizations, 
the clinical era involves convergence on a quality-based theorization surrounding the PET 
scanner based on scientific evidence. The HTAA report confirmed the appropriateness of the 
technology for applications in oncology in this organizational field thereby providing it with 
evidence-based legitimacy. The stamp of this agency essentially conferred taken-for-granted 
status (or cultural-cognitive legitimacy) on this technology, at least in this organizational field. 
This is corroborated by the fact that doctors deemed the technology as an essential procedure. 
This provided strong arguments for hospitals to fight to obtain a PET scanner. Convergence is 
also the main trait of the regulative era as the dissemination plan comes during another 
peaceful period. This plan specifies which hospitals will receive an operational budget. Any 
adoption from hospitals that are not in the plan would not be considered for further financing. 
Thus this agreement was required to protect the Ministry of health from being politically 
trapped in a situation where unapproved and chaotic adoptions continued, but would be seen 
as legitimate by the public. Because eras of convergence show a consensus over either the 
definition of an innovation or the way it should be implemented, this case study suggests the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Convergent logics of legitimation tend to speed up the diffusion of 
innovation in highly regulated environment with limited resources. 
This paper identifies different kinds of theorization involved in the legitimation of the 
diffusion of complex technologies. Some theorizations lean on scientific evidence to support 
their stance. Because science provides procedural legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), a special type 
of moral legitimacy, and because science is in our modern society a cognitive-cultural 
institution, evidence-based theorization that is further sanctioned by a reputed scientific 
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body embedded in a regulatory structure (such as the HTAA in our case) can be an extremely 
powerful force for legitimation. This type of theorization clearly draws on an institutional 
logic associated with quality (Scott, 2004). In contrast, access-based theorizations rely on the 
institutional logic of access (Scott, 2004), a logic that has had currency in the institutional 
environment since the introduction of universal coverage in health care systems and that 
remains powerful within the Canadian context. Arguments surrounding this type of 
theorization are infused with moral and pragmatic elements (Suchman, 1995) to support the 
wider diffusion of the less expensive form of the technology thereby democratizing access to 
it. Theorizations that focus on competence are again based on the professional discourse of 
quality, this time associated with buying the best available technology although it may be 
more expensive. Efficiency-based institutional logics were also drawn on in the theorizations 
we observed but more in a supporting role than as a central component. This is rather ironic 
given the high cost of this technology and the obvious impact of economic concerns in the 
dynamics of diffusion. 
Interestingly, it appeared that a legitimation strategy was a gestalt that involved a highly 
internally coherent discourse. There are no contradictory arguments within a type of 
theorization as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Contradictions are revealed at the interface of 
competing logics. Table 3 provides a summary of the characteristics of each of the four eras 
regarding the degree of convergence in discursive legitimation, the types of theorizations 
involved, what is at stake, the level of action, and the effects of the degree of convergence. 
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Table 3: Synthesis of the Four Eras 
Eras Degree of 
Convergence 
Types of 
Theorization 
At stake Level Effects 
1. Research Divergent Quality-based 
arguments 
building on 
evidence 
Competition 
between 
bodies of 
evidence 
Local Impede 
diffusion 
2. Clinical Convergent Quality-based 
arguments 
building on 
evidence 
Establishing 
the scientific 
basis for the 
innovation 
Provincial Speed up 
diffusion 
3.Confrontational Divergent Quality-based 
versus 
Access-based 
Finding the 
proper way to 
diffuse 
innovation 
Provincial Impede 
diffusion 
3a. Institutional 
delinquency 
Independent None Chaotic 
diffusion 
Local Speed up 
diffusion 
4. Regulation Convergent None Dissemination 
plan stops 
delinquency 
Provincial Speed up 
diffusion 
 
The power of the evidenced-based legitimation of the technology built up to such an extent 
that combined with the inertia of the authorities caused by the colliding logics of legitimation, 
institutional delinquency became a strategic move which ultimately accelerated the diffusion 
of the PET scanner. Facing repeated unanswered requests to acquire the PET scanner, the 
more prestigious hospitals began adopting the PET scanner technology without the consent of 
the government. As a result of their pressures, three hospitals obtained their PET scanner or 
started an acquisition procedure even before an official plan had been agreed on or even 
before they received the authorization from the authorities. This accelerated the diffusion of 
the PET scanner in this jurisdiction. By examining the role of evidence-based legitimation, 
our work stresses the way in which the idea of the PET scanner as a necessary clinical tool 
was built up by actors. Moreover, we also show how delays in diffusion may be pre-empted 
by a phenomenon we call institutional delinquency, that is when the moral legitimacy of the 
technology among professionals and managers becomes sufficient to counteract regulatory 
forces. The delinquency of A2 clearly represents a special type of institutional 
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entrepreneurship. The following proposition synthesizes these findings. 
Proposition 4: Institutional delinquency is a strategic behaviour that may speed up 
the diffusion of expensive and complex technology in a highly regulated 
environment when the moral and the cognitive-cultural legitimacies of a 
technology have acquired sufficient force to trump regulatory legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
This study contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics of legitimation and 
competition, and their effects on technology diffusion in a highly regulated organizational 
field. Scholars have faced significant hurdles in untangling the pattern of the diffusion of 
innovation by only considering competition (Renshaw et al., 1990). Both, competition and 
legitimation are crucial to elucidate the diffusion pattern of complex innovations. This study 
shows that in regulated fields, legitimation is a reflection of underlying competition, and that 
both forces interact in the diffusion of innovation. While most of the studies in the health 
economics (Chou et al., 2004; Dranove & Satterthwaite, 2000; Luft et al., 1986; Rapoport, 
1978; Vogt et al., 1995) are performed in a free market, this study takes place in a highly 
regulated environment. Because in such context, innovation is considered as a cost, the 
regulator is less inclined to finance innovation. Consequently, competition encourages inertia 
since it makes decisions difficult and politically risky for governments. This has the effect of 
slowing the diffusion of innovation in the short term, although it may stimulate greater 
investigation in the innovation in the longer term. For example, the HTAA was called on here 
essentially to better understand the validity of the arguments being put forward by competing 
groups concerning the evidence supporting the PET scanner. Hence, the role of competition in 
increasing or decreasing the diffusion rate of innovation depends on the context.  
While theorization is believed to be a powerful factor affecting institutional change 
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(Greenwood et al., 2002; Strang & Meyer, 1993; Strang & Soule, 1998; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996), this study also suggests that theorizations may 
sometimes engender counter-theorizations. It is the struggle between theorization and 
countertheorization that structures competition, thereby enhancing or inhibiting diffusion. 
Theorizations and counter-theorizations of complex innovations can sometimes draw on 
contradictions in institutional logics (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) as was the case in the 
confrontation era where different actors were using quality-based and access-based 
legitimation strategies, but they may also be created within the same fundamental institutional 
logic where actors rely on different definitions of the innovation and attempt to mobilize the 
institutions of science to support their ideas (as in the research era). In this case, different 
theorizations define the nature of the technology differently, identifying why and how an 
innovation should be diffused, and also who should adopt it. 
Finally planned economies are believed to rationally allocate resources. This study shows that 
fierce competition is at the heart of this type of economic system and that the result may be 
surprising and far from "rational". For example, the dynamics observed included a remote 
hospital B1 acquiring two PET scanners where none were yet operating in more populated 
regions, they included institutions in one region undermining each other's claims to the point 
where neither was able to progress, and they included instances where hospitals finally 
achieved their goals through institutional delinquency. There is a clear need for further 
research on the interaction of competition and legitimation in these contexts. 
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i
 Objectification can be defined as the growing consensus of the value of a social structure and its increasing diffusion (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1996). 
ii
 “The essence of an architectural innovation is the reconfiguration of an existing system to link together existing components in a new way” 
(Henderson & Clark: 1990: 12) 
iii
 Working alone, the PET scanner has to perform a correction in order to detect the anatomical structure. This correction takes approximately 
20-30 minutes. With the adjunct of a CT scanner, the production of the anatomical image is quasi instantaneous. 
iv
 In the Quebec Health care system, the explicit authorization from the government is required to buy any expensive technology. 
 
